UvA historian on Ukraine war: ‘Nuclear weapons meant as signal and deterrent’.

Ruud, last weekend Putin announced the possible use of nuclear weapons in the war with Ukraine. How realistic is that?

‘You can never completely rule it out, but I think it is mainly an offer of weakness at a time when the war is not going as Putin had expected. Besides, how rational is the use of a weapon of destruction? Putin’s aim is to bring Ukraine back into the Russian sphere of influence, but he cannot achieve that by destroying the country with a nuclear weapon. So I do not actually see what Putin has to gain from this militarily. Moreover, a nuclear weapon is seen as the last resort of a regime in a dire military situation, but that is not the case.’

And firing a nuclear missile at the West?

‘That could be in retaliation for the sanctions, for example, because they put Putin in a very difficult situation. But that option, which actually isn’t one, will also be off the table, because the West will retaliate.’

So why this threat from Putin?

‘I suspect that we should mainly see the threat as a signal that Putin himself no longer really knows how to proceed and therefore wants to sit around the negotiating table. The Ukrainians might also become a bit more nervous and therefore more pliable, he might think, if they are sitting around the table with a party that is threatening them with nuclear weapons.’

Does Putin still have an overview of the situation?

‘That is difficult to say, but it is an important question. There is a lot of talk about disinformation that the Russians are sending into the world, but to what extent does Putin himself still have the correct information? He has pushed all his opponents aside in recent years and is surrounded by yes-men who tell him what he wants to hear. So the question is whether he still gets correct and/or objective information from those around him.’

Is the use of a nuclear weapon really set in motion by the push of a button?

‘No, that is certainly not the case. Putin is in control of the civilian leadership, but he passes on his orders to the military leadership. The question is then whether the military will carry out his orders. It may be that the military leadership will resist out of fear of the consequences or to protect Putin from the consequences. In such a case, the military leadership can ignore his order. Of course, we do not know how it would really go, because we have little experience of it after the Second World War. Even in the 1960s, during the Cuban crisis, US President Kennedy and Russian President Khrushchev never went beyond a heightened state of nuclear preparedness.’

They were cowards.

‘In any case, not using these weapons says something about the self-control of leaders who have such a weapon under them. Once you have such a weapon at your disposal, you are also forced to think about the consequences of using it. Until now, leaders have always thought that they are not useful other than as a deterrent, because any goals you would like to achieve with their use are undermined if you actually do so. The political value of a nuclear weapon has so far proved far greater than its military value.’

Conclusion: a nuclear weapon will not be used.

‘I don’t think so. It is really meant as a signal and a deterrent. Putin wants to show in this way that he wants to be taken seriously. In the coming days we will see what effect this will have at the negotiating table.’

The UvA has several nuclear bunkers. So we don't have to go in there?

‘No, don’t count on it. Moreover, the nuclear cellar under the University Library is too small, too stuffy and poorly maintained. The UvA is not at all prepared for the use of that bunker.’